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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is a medical malpractice action. The appeal was originally filed in the Utah 
Supreme Court. That Court transferred the case to this Court by order dated June 12, 
1989. This Court has jurisdiction of the case pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the jury was properly instructed on the required proof of causation 
under Utah law. 
2. Whether plaintiff timely objected to the Special Verdict form, and whether 
the district court abused its discretion in framing the Verdict questions. 
3. Whether the district court properly denied plaintiffs motion for a directed 
verdict in favor of the defendant physicians. 
4. Whether the district court erred in awarding costs under U.R. Civ. P. 54. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The following determinative rules and statutory provisions are set out verbatim 
in the Addendum (Add. 24-34): 
U.R. Civ. P. 49, 51, 54, 59, and 61; 
U.C.A. §§ 78-27-38, -39, and -40. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action in which plaintiff alleges that the injuries and 
death of his wife, Betty George, were caused by the negligent care of her physicians, Dr. 
Kimball Lloyd and Dr. Michael Lahey, and LDS Hospital (the "Hospital"). (R. 2.) The 
defendant physicians entered into a settlement with plaintiff prior to trial. (PL Opening 
Statement p. 21; Trial Transcript, hereafter ffTr.fl, p. 853.) They nevertheless remained 
parties and were represented at trial for the purpose of apportioning any liability of the 
defendants. Following a jury trial, the jury rendered a special verdict finding that the 
defendant physicians were not negligent, that the Hospital staff was negligent, but that the 
Hospital's negligence was not a proximate cause of Mrs. George's injuries and death. 
(R. 397, Add. 1.) Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. (R. 587.) The 
district court subsequently entered its Final Judgment on the verdict in favor of all three 
defendants. (R. 709, Add. 5.) Plaintiff thereafter filed this appeal. (R. 739.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Betty George was a 51-year-old woman with a long history of health problems, 
including diabetes, hypertension, and obesity. Her physician, Dr. Brewerton, testified that 
because of the seriousness of these long-standing problems and her failure to control them 
properly, she was exposed to additional health risks and did not have an average life 
expectancy. In the summer of 1986, Mrs. George was found to have a tumor in her 
uterus and also began experiencing continuous vaginal bleeding. For these latter problems 
she was referred to Dr. Kimball Lloyd, a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology. Dr. 
Lloyd admitted Mrs. George to LDS Hospital on July 28, 1986 for exploratory surgery and 
a hysterectomy. Dr. Lloyd performed the surgery the next day without apparent 
complication. (Partial Transcript, hereafter "Part. Tr.,f, at 36-45; Tr. 351, 359; Trial 
Exhibit, hereafter "Ex.", 1 pp. 4, 12, 56.) 
On August 1, Mrs. George began showing signs of a respiratory problem. Dr. 
Lloyd ordered various tests to determine the cause of the problem, but the results were 
inconclusive. Dr. Lloyd then contacted Dr. Michael Lahey, a specialist in internal 
2 
medicine, to assist him in diagnosing the problem. After Dr. Lahey examined Mrs. George 
and her test results that evening, both doctors diagnosed the problem as pulmonary 
embolism, which is the presence of a blood clot in the lungs that prevents oxygenation of 
the blood and results in shortness of breath (hypoxemia). Mrs. George was accordingly 
administered oxygen, an anticoagulant drug, and scheduled for a pulmonary angiogram the 
next day to determine conclusively the presence of a pulmonary embolus. (Tr. 368-78, 
566-86; Ex. 1 p. 13.) 
Mrs. George was examined the next morning, August 2, by both Dr. Lloyd and 
Dr. Bearnson, a resident physician. Dr. Lloyd testified that Mrs. George's condition had 
not changed significantly from the previous day, but that it was still serious. Dr. Lloyd and 
Dr. Bearnson agreed that Mrs. George should be transferred from the gynecology floor 
to the Intensive Care Unit ("ICU") following her pulmonary angiogram. The pulmonary 
angiogram was performed later that morning, but the test revealed no sign of pulmonary 
embolism. (Tr. 82-83, 379-85, 504-15; Ex. 1 p. 90.) 
Dr. Lahey examined Mrs. George in the angiography suite just after completion 
of the test, around 1:00 p.m., and again in the ICU. He found her condition generally the 
same as the previous evening. In view of the negative test for pulmonary embolism and 
recent indications of elevated temperature and blood sugars, Dr. Lahey next proposed 
treatment for a possible infection. However, he concluded, in consultation with another 
resident physician, Dr. Adams, that since anticoagulant drug therapy was no longer 
indicated, and there was no other reason to keep Mrs. George in the ICU, she should be 
transferred back to the gynecology floor. Mrs. George was returned there at 
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approximately 2:30 p.m., was assigned a special duty nurse, and was prescribed tests for 
possible infection. (Tr. 85-86, 586-95, 689-702.) 
Mrs. George's condition began to show signs of worsening during the later 
afternoon of August 2. The special duty nurse made note of these changes, including high 
fever, and summoned Dr. Adams. Dr. Adams examined Mrs. George and called Dr. Lloyd 
at 4:15 p.m. regarding the fever and other changes. Dr. Lloyd ordered certain tests for 
infection and an antibiotic, which was administered soon thereafter. Because he did not 
issue the order "stat," requiring immediate performance, the test results were not expected 
for two to three hours. Dr. Adams examined Mrs. George again at 5:00 p.m. and found 
no change from the previous examination. At 6:30 p.m. Dr. Adams received some of the 
requested test results and called the special duty nurse with instructions to begin 
administering potassium, to control Mrs. George's heart rate, and to call Dr. Adams 
immediately to report any changes in the patient's mental status. The special duty nurse 
called Dr. Adams at 7:00 p.m. and reported that Mrs. George was not responsive. Dr. 
Adams went directly to examine Mrs. George and, finding no heart rate, summoned the 
emergency resuscitation team. The resuscitation team restarted Mrs. George's heart, but 
by then she was brain dead and required mechanical ventilation. In the meantime, Dr. 
Lloyd and Dr. Lahey arrived at the Hospital, examined Mrs. George, and eventually 
diagnosed her condition as sepsis, an overwhelming bacterial infection. Mrs. George 
remained in a coma until August 4, when she died following a second cardiac arrest. (Tr. 
390-404, 595-97, 703-16; Ex. 1 pp. 32, 169-71.) 
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Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action asserting both wrongful death and 
survival claims on behalf of the heirs and the estate. (R. 2.) As noted previously, the 
defendant physicians settled with plaintiff out of court, but were represented as parties at 
trial for purposes of apportioning liability. (PI. Open. Stat. p. 21; Tr. 853.)1 
At trial, plaintiff presented the expert testimony of Harriet Gillerman, a nurse, 
and Donald Owing, a respiratory therapist, regarding the standards of hospital care, the 
claimed breach of those standards, and the claimed result in proximately causing Mrs. 
George's injuries and death. (Tr. 169, 276.) Plaintiff presented no expert testimony from 
a physician regarding the proximate cause of the injuries and death. The Hospital, on the 
other hand, presented the expert testimony of three physicians, Dr. John Trowbridge, an 
expert in the diagnosis of infectious processes; Dr. Lewis Weinstein, an expert in 
obstetrical and gynecological infections; and Dr. Charles Elliot, an expert in respiratory 
medicine, all of whom testified that Mrs. George's arrest was caused by sepsis, probably 
emanating from the surgery; that the process of cascading infection was irreversible by the 
time Mrs. George returned from the ICU on the afternoon of August 2; and that nothing 
the Hospital staff could have done after that time would have changed her condition or 
prevented her death. (Trowbridge: Tr. 530-41; Weinstein: Tr. 640-44, 656-58; Elliot: Tr. 
752-64, 772-73, 780-81.) The jury obviously accorded more weight and credibility to the 
Hospital's experts, finding in a Special Verdict that while the Hospital staff breached the 
Plaintiff initially alleged that the Hospital was vicariously liable for the negligence of the student resident 
physicians, including Doctors Bearnson, Adams and others, who were employed by the University of Utah Medical Center. 
(R. 9.) However, consistent with the law, plaintiff later abandoned that theory, and the jury was properly instructed that 
no failure of any of the physicians, including the student residents, could be attributed to the Hospital. (Instruction 31, 
R. 529.) 
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standard of care, that breach was not the proximate cause of Mrs. George's injuries and 
death. (R. 397-99, Add. 1-4.) The district court accordingly entered Final Judgment in 
favor of the defendants. (R. 709, Add. 5-8.) Plaintiff now appeals, challenging principally 
the jury instructions related to proof of causation. (R. 739.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The primary focus of this appeal is on the district court's jury instructions 
pertaining to proof of causation in a medical malpractice action. Plaintiff failed to object 
to the refusal of his proposed jury instructions relating to "increased risk of injury" and 
"reduced chance of survival." In any event, the proposed instructions are inconsistent with 
plaintiffs belated "substantial factor" theory of the case, on which he requested no 
instruction. Moreover, the requested instructions are not justified by the evidence and are 
not supported by Utah law. 
Challenged jury instructions 16a and 21a correctly set forth the law of Utah 
regarding proof of causation. Plaintiffs objection to these instructions at trial was limited 
in scope and may not be expanded on appeal. The district court expressly ruled that the 
instructions were fairly included. Substantively, the instructions properly required plaintiff 
to prove the cause of Mrs. George's death and claimed injuries by expert medical 
testimony. In this case, that proof required testimony of a physician; the expert testimony 
of a nurse or respiratory therapist was insufficient. In light of the instructions as a whole, 
the district court correctly concluded that the jury was properly instructed. 
Plaintiffs objection to the Special Verdict form was not raised until the motion 
for new trial. In any event, the district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating 
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the verdict questions. The challenged question plainly referred to causation of all the 
claimed injuries and damages. 
The district court properly denied plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict in favor 
of the defendant physicians. Even if plaintiff has standing to assert such a motion, there 
was sufficient evidence of physician negligence to preclude a directed verdict. 
Finally, there is no error in the award of costs because the district court already 
considered and accounted for plaintiffs objections. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah law is clear that a medical malpractice plaintiff must provide expert 
testimony to establish (1) the standard of care; (2) the defendant's breach of that standard; 
and (3) that the breach proximately caused the claimed injuries. Hoopiiaina v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987). In this case there is no 
dispute regarding the first two elements. None of the parties challenges the jury findings 
that the defendant physicians were not negligent or that the Hospital was negligent. 
Plaintiffs appeal is directed only to the jury finding that the Hospital's negligence did not 
proximately cause Mrs. George's claimed injuries. Plaintiffs appeal is further limited in 
that he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, but rather 
challenges only the jury instructions on which it is based. In minor arguments, plaintiff 
also challenges the Special Verdict form, the presence of the defendant physicians as 
parties, and the award of costs. As demonstrated below, these arguments have no merit 
and present no grounds for a new trial under U.R. Civ. P. 59. (Add. 29-30.)2 
2 
The defendant Hospital here asserts a continuing objection to, and motion to strike, the addendum to plaintiffs 
brief. The addendum, rather than setting forth the items required by Rule 24(f), R. Utah Ct. App., contains extensive 
excerpts of trial testimony interspersed with argument and opinion of counsel. Presumably, after this Court denied 
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POINT I: THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE REQUIRED 
PROOF OF CAUSATION UNDER UTAH LAW. 
It is well established that parties to a trial are entitled to have their respective 
theories of the case presented to the jury in the form of instructions, but only if the theory 
is supported by the evidence and the law. The refusal of a requested instruction or the 
giving of a challenged instruction is reversible error only if it tends to confuse or mislead 
the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises 
on the law. See, e.g., Mikkeben v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App. 1988); Steele 
v. Breinholt, 141 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah App. 1987). Correctness of jury instructions is a 
question of law. Ramon v. Fan, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). Jury instructions must 
be examined as a whole, and the giving or refusal of an instruction is not prejudicial if the 
matter is adequately covered in other instructions. Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 
P.2d 638, 640 (Utah 1987); Bigler v. Mapleton Irrigation Canal Co., 669 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 
1983). Under these standards of review, there is no reversible error in the district court's 
jury instructions. 
A. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE REFUSAL OF HIS 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS 24 AND 32; IN ANY EVENT, THE 
DISTRICT COURT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON 
PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF CAUSATION. 
Plaintiff argues that the district court improperly refused his proposed jury 
instructions 24 and 32, pertaining to "increased risk of injury" and "lost chance of survival," 
and that the court thereby failed to instruct the jury on his theory of causation. (Br. of 
App. at 15-18.) However, plaintiff failed to raise this objection in the district court. 
plaintiffs motion to file an over-sized brief, counsel simply transferred to the addendum whatever argument would not fit 
within the page limitation. 
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Rule 51, U.R. Civ. P., states in relevant part: 
No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction 
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a 
party must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds 
for his objection. [Add. 26.] 
Construing this rule in Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 358 n.7 (Utah 1975), the Court 
stated: 
In order for a party to take advantage of a failure to give a correct 
instruction, he must have proposed such correct instruction and excepted 
to the trial court's failure to give it. 
The record discloses that while plaintiff proposed his instructions 24 and 32, he failed to 
except to the district court's refusal to give them. Therefore, plaintiff may not raise the 
claimed error in this Court. See Newsom v. Gold Cross Services, Inc., 116 U-A.R. 34, 779 
P.2d 692 (Utah App. 1989) (plaintiff precluded from asserting error in denial of lost 
chance of survival instruction). 
In any event, plaintiffs proposed instructions 24 and 32 do not correctly set forth 
the law of Utah regarding proof of causation in a medical malpractice action. Proposed 
instruction 24 states that if the Hospital's acts or omissions "increased the risk [of] harm" 
to Mrs. George, then on that basis alone the jury may find that the increased risk was a 
proximate cause of her death and injuries. (R. 251, Add. 9.) Proposed instruction 32 
states that if the Hospital's acts or omissions "destroyed a substantial possibility" for Mrs. 
George's survival, then the Hospital proximately caused her death and injuries. (R. 261, 
Add 10.) In support of these proposed instructions, plaintiff cites only cases from other 
jurisdictions. Those cases, aside from being irrelevant on the law of Utah, are 
unpersuasive for one of four reasons: (1) Several of the cited cases discuss only a 
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"substantial factor" test for causation as opposed to plaintiffs distinct instructions on 
"increased risk" and "lost chance of survival".3 Since plaintiffs requested instructions 24 
and 32 say nothing about a "substantial factor" test, plaintiff is precluded from urging such 
an instruction on appeal. See Newsom v. Gold Cross Services, Inc., supra, 116 UA.R. at 36 
(plaintiff failed to propose instruction consistent with "lost chance of survival" theory of 
causation). (2) Several other cases do discuss causation in terms of "increased risk" or 
"lost chance," but only based on expert testimony of a certain percentage chance of 
survival with proper care.4 Since plaintiff presented no such evidence in this case, the 
requested instructions were not justified. See Ramon v. Fan, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 
1989) (trial court justified in refusing instruction on plaintiffs theory of causation in 
medical malpractice action where plaintiff failed to represent legally sufficient evidence in 
support of the theory). (3) Other cases discuss evidence of "increased risk" as a threshold 
basis for sending the causation issue to the jury, but still impose some variation of the 
traditional standard of proof of "reasonable medical probability."5 (4) The remaining 
cases have no relevance to the requested jury instructions. 
Long established Utah law requires proof of proximate cause to a degree of 
"reasonable medical probability"; a showing of mere "increased risk" of injury or "reduced 
ZGradel v. Inouye, All A.2d 674 (Pa. 1980); Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp, 566 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 
Roberson v. Counsehnan, 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984); Rudeck v. Wright, 709 P.2d 621 (Mont. 1985); Snead v. 
United States, 595 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C. 1984). 
^Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Sharp, 741 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1987); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp,, 741 P.2d 
467 (Okla. 1987); Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983); Jeanes v. Milner, 428 
F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974). 
5McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972); Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1983); 
Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984). 
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chance" of recovery is legally insufficient as too speculative. For example, in the leading 
case of Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 P.2d 1021 (1938), the Court upheld a directed 
verdict for the defendant physicians on facts similar to those of the present case. The 
plaintiffs wife gave birth to a child; the mother seemed fine until about four days later 
when she developed a fever and high pulse rate; her doctors examined her periodically 
and prescribed certain medication, but did not discover her uterine infection for four more 
days; she died two days later of septic toxemia. 83 P.2d at 1023. Regarding the 
deficiency of evidence on causation, the Court stated: 
There is nothing arising out of the case that shows anything the 
defendants could or should have done that would or could have changed 
the unfortunate result. . . . 
. . . That there might have been neglect or lack of skill is not 
enough. To permit a cause to go to the jury on testimony showing only 
possibility, or what might or could have happened, is to permit a jury to 
base a verdict upon conjecture, speculation or suspicion. [Id. at 1029-
30.] 
See also Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257, 263, 265 (1931) ("[I]t is not enough to 
show the injury, together with the expert opinion that it might have occurred from 
negligence and many other causes. Such evidence has no tendency to show that 
negligence did cause the injury." Emp. added.) 
Following Edwards and Baxter, Utah courts have consistently required a medical 
malpractice plaintiff to prove more than that the challenged act or omission "possibly" 
caused the injury, or "increased the risk" of injury, or "reduced the chance" of recovery; 
rather, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged cause was medically probable. As stated 
in Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523, 526 (1957), "expert testimony must be 
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produced to show that the injuries alleged were probably caused by the lack of due care 
of defendant." Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah 1978), approved expert "opinion 
with probable medical certainty as to what caused the injuries." In Dickinson v. Mason, 
18 Utah 2d 383, 423 P.2d 663, 665 (1967), the mere "possibility that the finger might have 
been saved with [different] treatment" was held insufficient. In Posnien v. Rogers, 533 P.2d 
120, 122 (Utah 1975), "[n]either [expert] testified that the prolapse was probably caused 
by" the challenged treatment. And in Newsom v. Gold Cross Service, Inc., supra, this Court 
approved the jury instruction requiring proof of causation by medical probability, rather 
than a mere showing "that the result might have been different, or that there is a 
possibility that the result would have been different." 116 U.A.R. at 34. See also Marsh 
v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108, 1110 (1959). 
The district court's jury instructions accurately stated Utah law regarding the 
standard for proof of causation, consistent with the foregoing cases. Instruction 16 
required plaintiff to prove "[t]hat the negligence of LDS Hospital, through its employees, 
was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs." (R. 510, Add. 12.) 
Instruction 16a required that proof of causation be "[b]ased on a degree of reasonable 
medical probability." (R. 511, Add. 13.) Instructions 17, 20 and 21a variously restated 
those requirements. (R. 513, 516, 518, Add. 15-16, 18.) And Instruction 21 defined 
"proximate cause." (R. 517, Add. 17.) These instructions adequately informed the jury 
on plaintiffs theory of the case regarding claimed Hospital liability. {See Complaint, Third 
Cause of Action, R. 9-10.) The instructions provided ample authority for the jury to 
render a verdict against the Hospital had the jury not believed the Hospital's expert 
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witnesses regarding absence of causation. In summary, since the given instructions were 
more than adequate, and the requested additional instructions were not supported by 
either the evidence or the law, as explained above, the refusal of those instructions does 
not constitute reversible error. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURTS JURY INSTRUCTIONS CORRECTLY 
REQUIRED PROOF OF CAUSATION BY EXPERT MEDICAL 
TESTIMONY. 
Plaintiff objects to the giving of jury instructions 16a and 21a regarding the burden 
and manner of proving causation. (Br. of App. at 24; for text of instructions 16a and 21a 
see Add. 13, 18.) However, as noted above, Rule 51, U.R. Civ. P., requires that a party 
objecting to the giving of a jury instruction "must state distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds for his objection." (Add. 26.) Nonspecific objections, such as the 
instruction "is not supported by the evidence" or "does not correctly state the law," are 
insufficient to apprise the district court of the claimed error. Beehive Medical Electronics, 
Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1983). Moreover, "[ejxpansion on 
nonspecific objections in a motion for a new trial or in a brief on appeal, as plaintiff did 
in this case, does not cure the lack of timeliness in making proper objections to the trial 
court." Id. See also Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah 
1985). At trial, plaintiff objected to instruction 16a solely on the grounds that it "was 
confusing to the jury" and "is also contrary to law" in that it includes reference to Doctors 
Lloyd and Lahey. (Tr. 894-97.) The first ground is not sufficiently specific, and the 
second ground is addressed in Point III, below. Plaintiff objected to instruction 21a on the 
sole basis that it requires him to prove that the Hospital's negligence proximately caused 
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Mrs. George's death. (Tr. 889-91.) Other grounds for the objection raised in plaintiffs 
brief are therefore untimely and cannot provide a basis for relief. In any event, none of 
the grounds raised has merit. 
For example, plaintiff now argues that instructions 16a and 21a were added to 
the court's instructions unfairly, after they had been previously rejected in a certain "off-
record conference." (Br. of App. at 25-27.) Plaintiff made the same argument in his 
motion for new trial, and the district court emphatically rejected any notion that plaintiff 
was surprised or could rely on off-record discussions: 
THE COURT: The Court notes on the record that this case, like 
countless other cases which are tried by jury in this court, involve a lot, 
a significant amount of dialogue between the Court and counsel, regarding 
a number of matters, throughout the entire proceedings of the case. The 
Court has absolutely no recollection of what was discussed between 
counsel regarding a particular set of jury instructions. 
The process in this case, as in every other case, is on-going in 
refining jury instructions. It is the Court's recollection that the ultimate 
set of instructions given to the jury was the product of a number of 
conferences between the Court and counsel. 
Further, that there were many instructions proffered by both 
Plaintiff and Defendant that were discussed, modified, excluded, included, 
all of which was a culmination of many, many discussions between the 
Court and counsel about jury instructions. And the Court has absolutely 
no recollection of what was or was not discussed regarding a particular 
instruction. 
For that very reason, it was the Court's insistence that at some 
point in time during the proceedings counsel make a record regarding 
instructions offered and granted or instructions offered and refused by 
the Court. That was the policy of the Court in this case. That has been 
and will continue to be the policy of the Court in every case it tries. 
It is the responsibility of counsel, once the dialogue has concluded. 
between the Court and counsel regarding jury instructions, to make a 
record of them, indicating on the record what instructions were offered 
and accepted and what instructions were offered and refused. 
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The Court declines to accept any reference to what was or was 
not proposed and offered or proposed and refused, regarding the 
preparation of jury instructions in this matter. [Tr. of Motion for New 
Trial, R. 770, pp. 4-5, emp. added.] 
The Utah Supreme Court has similarly rejected reliance on unrecorded discussions 
regarding jury instructions. In Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988), the plaintiffs 
claimed to have objected to jury instructions in chambers, out of the presence of the court 
reporter. The Court concluded that because neither the parties nor the trial judge could 
recall the details of the conference and the objection could not be verified in the record, 
the Court would not consider the challenge to the instructions. Id. at 17. This Court 
took the same position in Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989), noting the 
appellant's burden to preserve a proper record for appeal, and "declining] to consider 
any statements not evidenced in the record." Id. at 1117. 
Plaintiff next challenges the requirement in instructions 16a and 21a that he prove 
the cause of the claimed injury, i.e., Mrs. George's death, and that the cause of death be 
established through expert medical testimony. (Br. of App. at 27-29.) Here, plaintiff 
argues against long-established legal principles. In a medical malpractice action, like any 
other negligence case, the plaintiff must prove that the substandard act or omission 
proximately caused the claimed injury. E.g., Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 
supra, at 271. In a wrongful death action, in which the claimed injury is death, the 
plaintiff must, of course, prove that the defendant's negligence caused the death. 22A 
Am. Jur. 2d, Death § 48 (1988). No statement by the district court interpreted by plaintiff 
to the contrary could alter that basic requirement of proof. See, e.g., EA. Strout Western 
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Realty Agency, Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1983) (trial court's 
comments cannot be interpreted to relieve counsel of established obligations at trial). 
Regarding the manner of proving causation, Utah law is clear that causation, like 
the other elements of a medical malpractice cause of action, must be established by expert 
medical testimony. As stated in Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 
1979): 
To make his prima facie case, plaintiff must introduce expert testimony 
establishing the appropriate standard of care and the causation of 
plaintiffs injuries. [Citations omitted.] 
This Court applied the same rule in Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, supra, 
affirming summary judgment for the hospital because the plaintiff failed to establish 
causation through expert medical testimony: 
In the absence of an expert to testify for plaintiff that the quinidine 
harmed him, the court correctly concluded that the jury would have no 
evidence upon which to base a finding that the quinidine caused any harm 
to plaintiff. [740 P.2d at 271-72.] 
See also Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 n.17 (1980) (proof of proximate cause 
"requires some expert testimony in medical malpractice cases1'); Huggins v. Hicken, supra, 
310 P.2d at 526. 
Moreover, expert medical testimony on causation requires testimony of a 
physician, rather than that of merely a nurse or respiratory therapist, as offered by 
plaintiff. In Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772, 773 (1951), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
The better-reasoned cases announce a rule of law to the effect that 
in those cases which depend upon knowledge of the scientific effect of 
medicine, the results of surgery, or whether the attending physician exercised 
the ordinary care, skill and knowledge required of doctors in the 
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community which he serves, must ordinarily be established by the testimony 
of physicians and surgeons. [Emp. added.] 
The Court reaffirmed this requirement in Huggins v. Hicken, supra, holding that the 
standard for postoperative care of a gall bladder patient "should be established by the 
testimony of physicians and surgeons." 310 P.2d at 525. The reasons for this requirement 
are two-fold. First, evaluation and determination of a medical condition and its cause 
comprise the essence of "diagnosis," which, undfer Utah law, constitutes the "practice of 
medicine," and can be engaged in only by a licensed physician. U.C.A. 58-12-28; Tolman 
v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D. Utah 1986). Second, an expert in one 
field of medicine is not qualified to testify on matters uniquely within the knowledge of 
experts in a higher, more complex, or more specialized field of medicine. See Burton v. 
Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985); Novey v. Kishwaukee Community Health 
Services Center, 531 N.E.2d 427 (111. App. 1988). Accordingly, neither a nurse nor a 
respiratory therapist is qualified to testify as to the cause of Mrs. George's death. See 
Jones v. Wike, 654 F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1981) (registered nurse not qualified as expert 
on post operative care of hernia patient). 
Finally, plaintiff argues that the causal connection between the Hospital's 
negligence and Mrs. George's death is so obvious that no expert testimony on causation 
is required. (Br. of App. at 29-38.) Again, plaintiff relies exclusively on cases from other 
jurisdictions that are distinguishable on their facts or standards of proof. 
Utah law recognizes an exception to the expert testimony rule, permitting liability 
to attach in the absence of such testimony only where lay persons could judge from 
common knowledge and experience that the injury would not have occurred with proper 
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skill and care. See Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980) (drill bit dropped down 
dental patient's throat); Nixdorf v. Hicken, supra, 612 P.2d at 352 (suture needle left inside 
surgery patient); Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951) (medical supplies 
left in suture of tonsillectomy patient). However, this is not such a case. Cases dealing 
with injuries of uncertain origin require expert testimony. See Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 
262, 139 R2d 216, 220 (1943) (failure to diagnose "general septicemia"); Forrest v. Eason, 
123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178, 180 (1953) (brain injury related to bacteriemia); Marsh v. 
Pemherton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959) (death of foot tissue following triple 
arthrodesis). 
Plaintiff would have the jury presume causation from the co-existence of Mrs. 
George's suffering and the Hospital's negligence. However, "[t]he fact that the plaintiff 
was injured does not raise a presumption or authorize an inference that the defendants' 
acts or omissions proximately caused the injury.11 Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 
P.2d 566, 569 (1949). Moreover, !,[t]here is nothing unlawful or inconsistent in a jury's 
finding that while a defendant is negligent, his negligence did not proximately cause the 
plaintiffs injury." Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah 
1981). A plaintiff may not "rest his case on the mere facts of his sufferings, and . . . rely 
upon the jury's untutored sympathies, without attempting specifically to evidence the 
defendant's unskillfulness as the cause of those sufferings." Baxter v. Snow, supra, 2 P.2d 
at 265. 
In summary, jury instructions 16a and 21a correctly state the law of Utah 
regarding proof of causation through expert medical testimony. 
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C THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS TAKEN AS A WHOLE REVEAL NO 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Plaintiff argues that jury instructions 16a and 21a, coupled with the refusal of his 
proposed instructions 24 and 32, resulted in prejudicial error requiring a new trial. - (Br. 
of App. at 38-41.) However, even if there were an error in the jury instructions, it was 
harmless. See Rule 61, U.R. Civ. P. (Add. 31); Ramon v. Fair, supra, 770 P.2d at 137. 
Judge Brian agreed in denying the motion for a new trial: 
The law never contemplated, in all of the annals of recorded case law, 
that a given case would be without error. It would be impossible for a 
trial to be error free. 
The Court has carefully considered all of the assertions and 
allegations and factors asserted by Plaintiff, in Plaintiffs motion for a new 
trial. The Court is convinced and persuaded that error may well have 
been committed by all of the participants in this case. But the Court is 
strongly persuaded that any error committed, in the totality of the trial, 
was harmless, that the trial was fair, that the case was vigorously 
presented, the jury was properly instructed, and that the verdict was a fair 
and an appropriate verdict, in light of the facts and the law. [Tr. of 
Motion for New Trial, R. 770, pp. 34-35.] 
The jury was clearly instructed that no single instruction, sentence or idea, 
although stated in varying ways, was to be singled out as more important than the others, 
but that the jury was Mto consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in 
the light of all the others." (Instruction 5, R. 499, Add. 11.) So considered, the jury 
instructions contained no prejudicial error. 
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POINT II: PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM WAS 
NOT TIMELY RAISED, AND THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FRAMING THE VERDICT QUESTIONS. 
Plaintiff argues that the Special Verdict form caused prejudicial error by 
precluding jury consideration of Mrs. George's pre-death injuries. (Br. of App. at 41-44.) 
However, plaintiff did not raise this argument at trial. Plaintiffs only objection to the 
Special Verdict form at trial was that it included reference to the defendant physicians. 
(Tr. 796-99, 894.) Plaintiff first raised this current objection regarding pre-death injuries 
in his reply memorandum in support of the motion for new trial. (R. 662.) Therefore, 
the matter is not timely raised and may not be considered on this appeal. See Rule 49, 
U.R. Civ. P. (Add. 24-25); Cambelt International Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 
(Utah 1987); Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 
1985). 
In any event, plaintiffs current argument has no merit. As stated in EA. Strout 
Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Utah 1983): 
It lies within the broad discretion of the trial court to determine 
whether special interrogatories are to be used and, if so, the content 
thereof. In the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion, the 
court's actions will not be disturbed. 
See also Cambelt International Corp., supra. Here, there was no abuse of discretion. 
Contrary to plaintiffs argument, question 3B on the Special Verdict form inquired 
regarding causation of all the claimed injuries: 
Was the negligence of LDS Hospital . . . a proximate cause of the death 
of Betty George and the damages claimed by David George and the heirs 
of Betty George? [R. 402-03, Add. 2-3, emp. added.] 
20 
The jury had previously been instructed that plaintiff sought "two different types" of 
damages, first on behalf of the heirs "for the wrongful death of Betty George," and 
second on behalf of the Estate of Betty George "for damages experienced personally by 
Betty George prior to her death." (Instruction 39, R. 539, Add. 20.) This instruction 
was thoroughly amplified by instructions 37, 38, 40, and 46. (R. 537-38, 540, 547, Add. 18-
19, 21-22.) In the context of these extensive instructions, question 3B plainly had 
reference to both types of claimed damages. Therefore, the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in framing the Special Verdict questions.6 
POINT III: THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS MOTION 
TO DIRECT THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT 
PHYSICIANS. 
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in refusing to direct the verdict in 
favor of the defendant physicians. (Br. of App. at 44-45.) However, any error in the 
ruling should be raised by the "aggrieved parties," the defendant physicians, not by the 
plaintiff. See, e.g., Goglia v. Bodner, 156 Ariz. 12, 749 P.2d 921, 927 (App. 1987). Even 
if properly raised, the argument has no merit.7 
Despite their pretrial settlement, the defendant physicians were properly retained 
as nominal parties at trial, pursuant to U.C.A. §§ 78-27-38 through -40, to assist the jury 
in fairly determining the proportion of fault and damages attributable to each defendant. 
It should be noted that plaintiffs proposed special verdict form cannot be located in the record. Moreover, 
question 3B on the form attached as Exhibit 1 to Brief of Appellant refers "to question # 5 above," not question 3A 
above," as quoted at page 43 n.l of the Brief. Even if the jury could have made sense of the confusing cross-references, 
plaintiffs proposed 3B differs from the court's 3B so slightly as to make no material difference. 
Plaintiff improperly interjects his opinion that the amount which the defendant physicians paid in settlement 
corresponded to their comparative negligence of 0-20 percent. That amount, while not a matter of record, more nearly 
approximated full compensation for the claimed injuries. 
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(Add. 32-34.) Without the defendant physicians present and listed on the Special Verdict 
form, the Hospital would have been unfairly prejudiced and potentially exposed to full 
liability for the other defendants' conduct. That is, of course, precisely why plaintiff 
wanted the Hospital as the sole defendant. In any event, contrary to plaintiffs assertions, 
there was sufficient evidence of the physicians' negligence to preclude a directed verdict, 
as the district court ruled. (Tr. 787-93.) In denying, as well, the motion to exclude the 
physicians from the Special Verdict form, the district court explained: 
The Court finds that there is abundant testimony from a number of 
witnesses, but specifically from the final witness called, that there was 
present early on in the postoperative history of the deceased that infection 
existed, and that infection was not properly identified and treated. It is 
a factual question for the jury. The Court so rules. [Tr. 799-800.] 
As it turned out, the jury found no negligence against the physicians anyway; therefore, 
denial of the motion to direct the verdict in their favor would be, at most, harmless error. 
Rule 61, U.R. Civ. P. (Add. 31.) 
POINT IV: THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN THE AWARD 
OF COSTS UNDER RULE 54. 
Plaintiffs final argument challenges the district court's award of costs. (Br. of 
App. at 46-47.) Rule 54(d)(1) provides that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." (Add. 27.) The Hospital, as prevailing 
party, accordingly submitted a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements in the amount 
of $2,291.58. (R. 690.) After considering plaintiff objections, the district court reduced 
the cost award to only $641.58, as set forth in the Final Judgment. (R. 711, Add. 7.) 
Plaintiffs assertion that the district court awarded the Hospital "the full $2,291.58" is 
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simply false, and plaintiff presents no valid basis for disturbing the reduced award of 
$641.58. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district court's Final 
Judgment in all respects. 
DATED this . g ^ ^ d a y of October, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
LDS Hospital 
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Kathryn P. Collard 
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Attorneys at Law 
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Elliot Williams 
Attorney at Law 
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Tony Eyre 
Attorney at Law 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID GEORGE, et al. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., MICHAEL 
LAHEY, M.D., and INTERMOUNTAIN 
HEALTH CARE, dba LDS HOSPITAL 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. C-87-4199 
Judge Pat Brian 
At the end of each proposition submitted to you, indicate 
your finding by placing an "X" in the appropriate line. If 
there is preponderance of the evidence in favor of the 
proposition, indicate by finding "yes." If there is 
preponderance of the evidence against the proposition, indicate 
by finding "no." If there is no preponderance of the evidence 
either way on the proposition, indicate by answering "no." 
We, the jury in this action, find the answers to the 
questions propounded to us, as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1 
A. Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of Betty 
George? 
ANSWER: Yes No x 
B. If you answered "yes" to question No. 3A above, then 
and only then answer the following question: Was the negligence 
of Dr. Kimball Lloyd a proximate cause of the death of Betty 
George and the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of 
Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 2 
A. Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of Betty 
George? 
ANSWER:- Yes No 
B. If you answered "yes" to question No. 2A above, then 
and only then answer the following question: Was the negligence 
of Dr. Michael Lahey a proximate cause of the death of Betty 
George and the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of 
Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 3 
A. Was LDS Hospital through its nursing staff and/or 
respiratory therapists negligent in their care of Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
B. If you answered "yes" to No. 3A above, then answer 
the following question: Was the negligence of LDS Hospital 
including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory therapists, a 
o 
proximate cause of the death of Betty George and the damages claimed by 
David George and the heirs of Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
If you answered f,nofl to question 3A or 3B, or if you found no 
preponderance of the evidence either way, then answer no further questions. 
gjESTTON NO. 4 
What is the amount of damages, if any, sustained by David George, 
and the heirs of Betty George and the estate of Betty George? Ihis question 
should be answered only if you answered "yes" to question No. 3A and 3B. 
General Damages 
a. Loss of consortium $ 
b. Pain and suffering of Betty George $ 
Special Damages including: 
a. Funeral and Burial expenses $ 
b. Medical expenses $ 
c. Lost inccene, benefits and household services $ 
QUESTION NO. 5 
Assessing a percentage only to a party or parties found negligent, 
considering the negligence to amount to 100 percent, what percentage of 
negligence is attributed to: 
a. Dr. Kimball Uqyd % 
b. Dr. Michael Lahey % 
c. IDS Hospital, its nurses 
and/or respiratory therapists 
% 
Total 100 % 
Dated t h i s f ( 3 a v of A/fifeus-fey . 1988, 
V. 
JURY FOREPERS 
-4_ 
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Thirci Judicial District 
Brinton R. Burbidge - A0491 
Larry R. White - A3446 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID GEORGE, individually and 
as personal representative of 
the Estate of Betty George, and 
as personal representative for 
the heirs of Betty George, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., MICHAEL 
LAHEY, M.D., and INTERMOUNTAIN 
HEALTH CARE, dba LDS HOSPITAL, 
Defendant. 
This matter came on for trial on October 31, 1988, 
before the Honorable Pat B. Brian and the juVy impaneled. After 
the close of evidence on November 9, 1988, special 
interrogatories concerning the liability, if any, of the 
defendants for the claims of the plaintiff were submitted to the 
jury in the form of a Special Verdict. They jury answered the 
following questions as set forth below: 
MAR 2 1989 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-87-4199 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
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Question No. 1 
A. Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of 
Betty George?. 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
Question No. 2 
A. Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of 
Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
Question No. 3 
A. Was LDS Hospital through its nursing staff and/or 
respiratory therapists negligent in their care of Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
B. If you answered "yes" to number 3A above, then 
answer the following question: Was the negligence of LDS 
Hospital including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory 
therapists, a proximate cause of the death of Betty George and 
the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of Betty 
George? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
Based on the verdict of the jury the Court determines 
that a judgment of no cause of action should be entered in favor 
of Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey and Intermountain Health 
Care, dba LDS Hospital and against David George in his 
individual and representative capacities. 
-2-
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THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Judgment of no cause of action should be and is 
hereby awarded in favor of the defendants, Dr. Kimball Lloyd, 
Dr. Michael Lahey and Intermountain Health Care, dba LDS 
Hospital, and against David George in his individual and 
representative capacity. 
2. That the plaintiff David George, individually and 
as personal representative of the estate of Betty George and 
heirs of Betty George and heirs of Betty George take nothing by 
his complaint. 
3. The defendant, Intermountain Health Care, dba LDS 
Hospital, should be and is hereby awarded its costs in this 
action in the amount of $. i a l L ^ 
DATED this*eH±r day of Febr t r a ry , 1989. 
DISTRICT COURT 
Pat B. Brian 
District Judge 
-3-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Final Judgment was mailed this 
/ 
&. day of 
Lu
^'X' 1589, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Stephen Russell, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
415 Judge Building 
#8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Elliott J. Williams, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Lloyd 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
J. Anthony Eyre, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Defendant Lahey 
1 City Centre, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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8 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
If plaintiffs demonstrate that the acts or omissions of LDS 
Hospital increased the risk or harm to Betty George, such evidence 
furnishes a basis for you to go further and find that the 
increased risk was a proximate cause resulting in the death of 
Betty George, and the consequent injuries and damage suffered by 
her immediate family and Estate. 
AUTHORITY: 
GRADEL V. INOUYE, 421 A.2d 674, 678 (Pa. 1980); HAMIL V. 
BASHLINE, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978). 
9 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 32 
In this case plaintiffs have alleged that the acts and 
omissions of LDS Hospital by and through its officers, agents and 
employees resulted in the failure of Betty George to receive the 
medical care necessary to save her life, and ability to continue 
living in a normal and productive fashion. Should you determine 
that the negligence of LDS Hospital effectively terminated Betty 
George!s chance for a normal life, then you should disregard any 
conjecture as to the measure of the chance for a normal life that 
was eliminated. 
That isf if you find that the negligence of LDS Hospital 
destroyed a substantial possibility that Betty George might have 
survived and returned to a healthy, productive state, then 
defendants are liable for whatever injuries and damage was thereby 
proximately caused. 
AUTHORITY: 
HICKS V. U.S., 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966). 
10 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
If in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is 
stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none 
should be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single 
out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction 
as more important than the others, but you are to consider all the 
instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all 
the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no 
significance as to their relative importance. 
11 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. /*? 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence each of the following propositions: 
1. That LDS Hospital, through its employees, failed to 
comply with the applicable medical standard of care, and that in 
so acting or failing to act, LDS Hospital was negligent. 
2. That the plaintiffs to this action were injured as a 
result of that negligence. 
3. That the negligence of LDS Hospital, through its 
employees, was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the 
plaintiffs. 
4. The nature and extent of the injuries and damage, and 
the amount thereof. 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater 
weight of the evidence, that is, such evidence as, when weighed 
with that opposed to it, is more convincing as to its truth. 
12 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The plaintiff in this case cannot recover against the 
doctors or the hospital unless it is proven, that, 
1. Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS 
Hospital's nursing staff or respiratory therapist or all of 
them, based on a degree of reasonable medical probability, 
failed to exercise that degree of reasonable care and skill in 
caring for the plaintiff that was ordinarily possessed and used 
by others in the respective profession practicing in 1986 in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar communities under similar 
circumstances; 
2. Based on a degree of reasonable medical probability 
established through expert medical testimony from a duly 
qualified medical doctor, that such failure, if any, was the 
proximate cause of the death of Betty George; and 
3. That David George personally, and the heirs of Betty 
George, and the representative of the estate of Betty George, 
was damaged by the negligence, if any, of one of the defendants 
or all of them. 
If you do not find, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
all of the foregoing propositions with regard to either Dr. 
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS Hospital, the party or 
parties, as the case may be, against whom any one proposition is 
not found cannot be found to have committed medical malpractice 
and your verdict must be in favor of that defendant or 
13 
defendants. If you find that the evidence is evenly balanced on 
any of the above-mentioned issues, then your verdict should be 
for the defendant or defendants on whose behalf the evidence is 
evenly balanced. 
-2- 14 
INSTRUCTION NO. / ^ 
In this lawsuit in order for the plaintiff to recover 
damages from LDS Hospital he must prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence based on a reasonable degree of medical 
probability, the following: 
1. That the defendant, LDS Hospital, was negligent in 
not providing to Betty George that level of nursing care 
ordinarily exercised in like cases by reputable members of the 
nursing profession or medical technicians, as the case may be, 
practicing in the same, or in a similar locality in July and 
August of 1986. 
2. That such failure was a proximate cause of the death 
of Betty George. 
3. That the death of Betty George caused the damages 
claimed by David George. 
15 
Jury Instruction No. 
You are instructed that with respect to the plaintiff's claim 
that one or more of the defendants committed medical malpractice, 
the term "burden of proof" means that the plaintiff has the 
responsibility to prove his claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence based ona reasonable degree of medical probability. If 
the evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force 
respecting plaintiff's claim, you must find that her claim has not 
been proved. However, if you find that the evidence preponderates 
in the slightest degree in favor of plaintiff's claim, then you 
must find that the plaintiff's claim has been proved. 
16 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The proximate cause of an injury is that which, in natural 
and continuous sequence produces the injury, and without which the 
result would not have occurred. There may be more than one 
proximate cause for an injury. 
17 
INSTRUCTION NO, * 
You are instructed that where the proximate cause of 
Betty George's death and therefore the injury or loss claimed by 
plaintiff is not established by a preponderance of the evidence 
based on reasonable medical probability from testimony of a 
medical doctor, but is left to conjecture or speculation and may 
be reasonably attributed to causes over which the hospital or 
doctor had no control or responsibility, then the plaintiff has 
failed to sustain the burden of proof as to proximate 
causation. 
18 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. J^ 
Plaintiff David George on behalf of the Estate of Betty George, 
and as personal representative of the heirs of Betty George, Gail 
Hoover, David George Jr., Cynthia Brown and Traci Lee Huber, is 
entitled to recover any and all damages for injuries, past and 
future, which were proximately caused by negligence of defendant 
LDS Hospital through the acts of its employees including nurses 
and respiratory therapists, Dr. Kimball Lloyd or Dr. Michael 
Lahey. 
19 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ?o 
If you find in favor of the plaintiff and .against any 
defendant, it will then be your duty to award the plaintiff such 
damages as you find from a preponderence of the evidence will 
fairly and adequately compensate them for all the injuries and 
damages they have sustained as a proximate result of defendant's 
conduct. 
20 
3*1 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case, plaintiffs seek damages of two different types. 
David George, individually, and as the personal representative of 
his children, Gail Hoover, David George Jr., Cynthia Brown, and 
Traci Lee Huber, seeks damages on their claim for the wrongful 
death of Betty George. Such damages, which are explained further 
in these instructions, are specifically allowed by law under 
Utah's Wrongful Death Statute. 
David George, as personal representative of the Estate of 
Betty George, has made a claim for damages experienced personally 
by Betty George prior to her death. These damages are 
specifically allowed by law under Utah's Survival Statute, and are 
explained further in these instructions. 
21 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
David George, as personal representative of the Estate of 
Betty George, has made a claim for the injuries and damage 
suffered by Betty prior to her death. 
In the event that you find that the negligence of any of the 
defendants proximately resulted in injury or damage to Betty 
George prior to her death, then you may award the Estate that 
amount of damages which would fairly and adequately compensate for 
them. In so doing, you may consider her pain, suffering, mental 
anguish and emotional distress to the extent proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. H({) 
If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff, the 
heirs of Betty George, or the Estate of Betty George is entitled 
to recover damages from the defendants, or any of them, you must 
award that amount of damages which will fairly and adequately 
compensate them for the injuries and damage sustained. However, 
you are not permitted to add any amount to your verdict for 
federal or state income taxes, court costs, attorneys1 fees, or 
for the purpose of punishing any defendant. 
Rule 48 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on 
voir dire in personal injury or death action as 
to previous claims or actions for damages by 
himself or his family, 38 A.L.R.4th 267. 
Propriety of asking prospective female jurors 
questions on voir dire not asked of prospective 
male jurors, or vice versa, 39 A.L.R.4th 450. 
Visual impairment as disqualification, 48 
A.L.R.4th 1154. 
Professional or business relations between 
proposed juror and attorney as ground for chal-
lenge for cause, 52 A.L.R.4th 964. 
Validity of verdict awarding medical ex-
penses to personal injury plaintiff, but failing 
to award damages for pain and suffering, 55 
A.L.R.4th 186. 
Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on 
voir dire regarding previous claims or actions 
against himself or his family, 66 A.L.R.4th 
509. 
Examination and challenge of federal case 
jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexual-
ity, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 864. 
Key Numbers. — Jury «=> 66,72,112,114 to 
121, 125, 126, 131(1) to 133, 136, 148, 149; 
Trial *» 28,303,307,312,313,316,321,321V2, 
324, 325, 339, 340. 
Rule 48. Juries of less than eight — Majority verdict. 
The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less 
than eight or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall 
be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury. 
Compiler's Notes. -
Rule 48, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. 
§ 78-46-5. 
• This rule is similar to 
Number of jurors, 
Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in 
civil case, Utah Const, Art. I, Sec 10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of Rule 47(q). 
Removal of municipal officer. 
Effect of Rule 47(q). 
Intent of Rule 47(q) is to allow the parties 
the opportunity to ensure that the requisite 
number of jurors concurred in the verdict; it is 
not a vehicle to bring into issue the court's in-
struction as to the number of concurring jurors 
required to reach a verdict. Madesen v. Brown, 
701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985). 
Removal of municipal officer. 
Removal of municipal officer does not re-
quire unanimous verdict by a jury; a three-
fourths majority is acceptable. Madesen v. 
Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 124 diet by number or proportion of jurors less than 
et seq. that constitutionally permitted, 15 A.L.R.4th 
C.J.S. — 50 CJ.S. Juries § 123; 89 CJ.S. 213. 
Trial § 494. Key Numbers. — Jury «=» 32(2); Trial «=» 
A.L.R. — Validity of agreement, by stipula- 32lh. 
tion or waiver in state civil case, to accept ver-
Rule 49. Special verdicts and interrogatories. 
(a) Special verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special 
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that 
event the court may submit to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of 
categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several 
special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and evi-
dence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring 
the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall 
give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus 
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submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon 
each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the 
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of 
the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission 
to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a 
finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in 
accord with the judgment on the special verdict. 
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories. The 
court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general 
verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of 
which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or 
instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to 
the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct 
the jury both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When 
the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judg-
ment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A. 
When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsis-
tent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58A 
in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the 
court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict 
or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other 
and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment 
shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for further consider-
ation of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial. 
Compilers Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 49, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Appeals. 
Where plaintiff did not object below, it can-
Ambiguous interrogatories or verdicts.
 n o t raise the failure to give special verdicts or 
Appeals. interrogatories on appeal without showing spe-
Discretion of court.
 cjaj circumstances warranting such a review. 
Effect of inconsistent answers Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 
Entering judgment in accordance with an- (Utah 1987) 
swers. 
Interest. Discretion of court. 
Objections to questions. The matter of entering judgment in accor-
Proximate cause issue. dance with the answers to special interrogator-
Role of jury. j e 9 is within the discretion of the trial judge. 
—Special verdicts. Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nel-
Special interrogatories. son, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (1960). 
k1*^* Use of a special verdict is left to the discre-
Ambiguous interrogatories or verdicts. £ o n o f ^ ^ a l c o u r t ' R e i s e r v ' L o h n e r ' 6 4 1 
When special interrogatories or verdicts are ^-^d 93 (Utah 1982). 
ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to li 1S within the broad discretion of the trial 
object to the filing of the verdict or to move c o u r t to determine if special interrogatories 
that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for 2U*e to De u s e d ^ d , # s o used, the content 
clarification; if a party fails to take appropriate thereof. E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v. 
action before the discharge of the verdict, that W.C. Foy & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983). 
party generally may not later move for a new The use of special verdicts or interrogatories 
trial on the ground that the verdict was defec- is a matter for the trial court's sound discre-
tive. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., tion. Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 
701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985). 1239 (Utah 1987). 
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(Utah 1982); Wilderness Bldg. Sys. v. Chap- Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah 
man, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Gagon v. State Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments fusal to direct verdict against him, 10 A.L.R.3d 
§§ 106 to 151; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 463 et 1330. 
s^- Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
00
C£'h~^i9,Ccf*omudgJSLnt8 § § 5 9 to 6 1 ; ^ affected by opponent's motion for summary 
8SACLI 5 S L 2 J S noS t , judgment, or * ^ J $ T A ~ £ ftf"* " * 
direction of verdict on opening statement of ^ *«**• 3 6 A ^ * ' 3 d 1 1 1 3 '
 o n ^ , 
counsel in civil action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405. Key Numbers . - Judgmen t s 199; T r i a l s 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's 167 to 181. 
argument or comment as to trial judge's re-
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall inform counsel of its 
proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties 
stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive this 
requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all objections 
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, 
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the, 
giving orjhe failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In object-
ing to thTgiving~of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to 
which he objects ^ nd the grounds foFhis objection. Notwithstanding the fore-
going requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of 
justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity 
shall be given to make objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of 
the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, 
and if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that 
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- Compiler's Notes. — This section varies 
ment, in the first paragraph, deleted "during substantially from Rule 51, F.R.C.P., after 
the trial" following "time" in the first sentence, which it is patterned. 
made a minor punctuation change in the sec- Cross-References. — Exceptions unneces-
ond sentence, and inserted "of" in the next-to- sarv> Ru^e 46. 
last sentence; and substituted "jurors" for 
"jury" in the second sentence in the second 
paragraph. 
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PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
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file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985). 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) 
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the 
appellate court and costs in original proceed-
ings before the Supreme Court, were repealed 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. For 
present provisions, see Rule 34(d) of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court and the Committee 
Note thereto, and Rule 34(d) of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 54, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — As to costs on ap-
peals, see Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Continuances, discretion to require payment 
of costs, Rule 40(b). 
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs, 
§ 49-6-301. 
State, payment of costs awarded against, 
§ 78-27-13. 
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule 
62(h). 
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of express determination. 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Appeal as of right. 
Certification not determinative. 
Costs. 
—In general. 
—Challenge of award. 
—Depositions. 
—Discretionary. 
—Expenses of preparation for action. 
—Failure to object. 
—Liability of state. 
—Service on adverse party. 
—Statutory limits. 
—Untimely filing of memorandum. 
—When not demanded. 
Default judgments. 
Effect of partial final judgment. 
Final order. 
—Claims for relief. 
—Complete disposal of claim or party. 
Inconsistent oral statements. 
Interest on judgment. 
Judgment based on impleaded theory. 
Judgment in favor of nonparty. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Pleading in the alternative. 
Presumption of finality. 
Real party in interest. 
Relief not demanded in pleadings. 
Specific performance request. 
Unpleaded issue tried by consent. 
Cited. 
Absence of express determination. 
In action based on alleged breach of loan 
agreement, where trial court improperly dis-
missed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with 
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judg-
ment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judg-
ment on cross-claim and counterclaim would 
be subject, on remand, to revision since all 
claims presented had not been adjudicated and 
since trial court made no express determina-
tion as required by this section. M. & S. Constr. 
& Eng'g Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah 
2d 139, 467 P.2d 410 (1970). 
Amendment of pleadings. 
The proper application of Rule 15(b) and 
Subdivision (c)(1) of this rule, is that amend-
ments should be allowed where a case has ac-
tually been tried on a different issue or a differ-
149 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 59 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfac-
tion and discharge operated to satisfy and dis-
charge everything merged in and adjudicated 
by the judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v. Keith 
O'Brien Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943. 
Owner or attorney. 
—Vacation of satisfaction. 
Hearing. 
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed 
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated with-
out action and hearing in equity, and the lien 
of an attorney against the proceeds of the judg-
ment does not include his personal right to exe-
cute against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V. 
Fed. Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 979 et seq. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 49 C J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. Key Numbers. — Judgment *=* 891 to 899. 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
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ANALYSIS 
Court. 
—Duty. 
Attachment. 
Effect. 
—Acceptance of full payment. 
Owner or attorney. 
—Vacation of satisfaction. 
Hearing. 
Court 
—Duty. 
Attachment 
Court had duty to make order directing par-
tial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money 
collected through attachment proceeding. 
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805. 
Effect 
—Acceptance of full payment 
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay-
29 
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(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 59, F.R.C.F. 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
for new trial, § 21-2-2. 
Harmless error not ground for new trial, 
Rule 61. 
ANALYSIS 
Abandonment of motion. 
Accident or surprise. 
Arbitration awards. 
Caption on motion for new trial. 
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict. 
Correction of record. 
Costs. 
Decision against law. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Effect of order granting new trial. 
Effect of untimely motion. 
Evidence. 
—Sufficiency. 
Excessive or inadequate damages. 
Failure to object to findings of fact. 
Filing of affidavits. 
Incompetence or negligence of counsel. 
Misconduct of jury. 
Motion to alter or amend judgment. 
Motion to be presented to trial court. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
New trial on initiative of court. 
Particularization of grounds for motion for new 
trial. 
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial. 
Reconsideration of motion for new trial. 
Settlement bare appeal. 
Summary judgment. 
Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 606. 
Time for motion. 
Toiling time for appeal. 
Waiver. 
Cited. 
Abandonment of motion. 
Abandonment of motion for new trial must 
be intentional, and the facts must indicate this 
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 
1043 (Utah 1984). 
Accident or surprise. 
A ^surprise" at trial which could have been 
easily guarded against by utilization of avail-
able discovery procedures may not serve as a 
ground for a new trial under Subdivison (a)(3). 
Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 339 (Utah 
1979). 
Failure to interpose a timely objection to tes-
timony challenged on the ground of surprise 
would be a sufficient reason to deny a motion 
for a new trial on that ground. Choumos v. 
D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982). 
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on 
the basis of surprise concerning testimony of 
the defendant's expert witness where the 
plaintiff failed to object to the testimony either 
before, or immediately after, it was given. 
Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977). 
Claim of error based on accident or surprise, 
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record. Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 
602 (1952). 
Where the affidavit for publication of sum-
mons presented no evidentiary facts, a default 
judgment entered against the defendant can be 
attacked collaterally. Bowen v. Olson, 122 
Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952). 
Unauthorized appearance. 
Wife who had been personally served with 
process but had no actual knowledge of action 
was not entitled to relief from judgment 
against her and her husband on ground that 
appearance for her by attorney retained by 
husband was without her authority. Plaintiff 
would have been entitled to default judgment 
against wife, and his position could not be 
worsened by unauthorized appearance over 
which he had no control. Brimhall v. Mecham, 
27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P.2d 525 (1972). 
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299, 
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Cox, 16 
Utah 2d 20, 395 P.2d 55 (1964); Parker v. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 200, 671 et seq. 
C.J.S. —49 CJ.S. Judgments §§ 228 et seq., 
237. 
A.L.R, — Incompetence of counsel as ground 
for relief from state court civil judgment, 64 
A.L.R.4th 323. 
Relief from judicial error bv motion under 
F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1), 1 A.L*R. Fed. 771. 
Propriety of conditions imposed in granting 
relief from judgment under Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. Fed. 956. 
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of 
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or 
other parts of the records and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A.L.R. 
Fed. 794. 
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5) 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 61, F.R.C.P. 
Rolfson, 525 P.2d 612 (Utah 1974); Dynapac, 
Inc. v. Innovations, Inc., 550 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1976); Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123 
(Utah 1977); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 
589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978); Peay v. Peay, 607 
P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. 
Osborne, 622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Kohler v. 
Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); St. 
Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982); 
Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495 (Utah 1983); 
Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1984); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 
(Utah 1985); In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 
1345 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 
(Utah 1986); Myers v. Garff, 655 F. Supp. 1021 
(D. Utah 1987); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 
1318 (Utah 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 
1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Blodgett v. Zions 
First Natl Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 101 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 48 (1989). 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing 
relief from final judgment where its prospec-
tive application is inequitable, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 
309. 
Independent actions to obtain relief from 
judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule 
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
53 A.L.R. Fed. 558. 
Lack of jurisdiction, or jurisdictional error, 
as rendering federal district court judgment 
"void" for purposes of relief under Rule 60(b)(4) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A.L.R. 
Fed. 831. 
Effect of filing of notice of appeal on motion 
to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 A.L.R. Fed. 148. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 294 et seq., 
306, 307. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturb-
ing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that 
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose 
faujt exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to 
that defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 2. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to 
special verdicts, and reenacts the above sec-
tion. 
ANALYSIS 
Assumption of risk. 
Bailment. 
Causation. 
Jury instructions. 
Last clear chance. 
Unit method of determining negligence. 
Cited. 
Assumption of risk. 
"Assumption of risk," i.e., risk of a known 
danger voluntarily assumed, may amount to a 
lack of due care constituting negligence; where 
such is the case and the party assuming the 
risk is the plaintiff in an action governed by 
comparative negligence statute, he is charge-
able with contributory negligence and is liable 
to have his recovery reduced or denied in accor-
dance with its provisions. Rigtrup v. Straw-
berry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 
1977). 
Assumption of risk language is not appropri-
ate to describe the various concepts previously 
dealt with under that terminology but is to be 
treated, in its secondary sense, as contributory 
negligence; when the issue is raised attention 
should be focused on whether a reasonably pru-
dent man in the exercise of due care would 
have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge 
of it, and if so, whether he would have con-
ducted himself in the manner in which the per-
son seeking to recover acted in light of all the 
surrounding circumstances, including the ap-
preciated risk; then, if the unreasonableness of 
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be 
less than that of the person from whom recov-
ery is sought, any damages allowed should be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of neg-
ligence attributable to the person recovering. 
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, 
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration 
or modification of product after sale is substan-
tial contributing cause of injury, § »78-15-5. 
Skiers not to make claim against or recover 
from ski area operator for injury resulting from 
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53. 
Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Eng'g, 
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980). 
As used in § 78-27-37, "assumption of risk" 
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a 
known danger. Moore v. Burton Lumber & 
Hdwe. Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981). 
Bailment. 
The comparative negligence statutes do not 
change the rule that the negligence of a bailee 
in handling the bailed property is not imputed 
to the bailor. Otto v. Leany, 635 P.2d 410 
(Utah 1981). 
Causation. 
Trial court committed prejudicial error in 
submitting to jury question of plaintiffs com-
parative negligence where his act of alleged 
negligence did not in any way contribute to his 
injury, although it may have increased sever-
ity of damages; comparative negligence be-
comes a defense for defendant where plaintiffs 
negligent conduct was a contributing factor in 
causing injury. Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 
P.2d 728 (Utah 1984). 
Jury instructions. 
If requested, a trial court must inform the 
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning 
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it 
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the 
effect of such an instruction will not be to con-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
426 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-39 
fuse or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart, 658 
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
Last clear chance. 
With the adoption of the Comparative Negli-
gence Act, the doctrine of last clear chance as a 
distinct tort doctrine was extinguished along 
with contributory negligence; however, argu-
ment to the jury as to whether a party may or 
may not have had the last clear chance to avoid 
injury is not precluded, and as bearing on 
which party was guilty of the greater negli-
gence, last clear chance becomes just one of 
many factors to be weighed in the comparison. 
Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
Unit method of determining negligence. 
In a medical malpractice case, the "Wiscon-
sin" method of determining comparative negli-
gence, whereby each defendant's negligence is 
compared against the plaintiffs, was rejected 
in favor of the "unit" method whereby the neg-
ligence of all the defendants is taken together 
in making the comparison. Jensen v. Inter-
mountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903 
(Utah 1984). 
Cited in Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 
(Utah 1979). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, A Primer on 
Damages Under the Utah Wrongful Death and 
Survival Statutes, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 519. 
Comment, McGinn v. Utah Power & Light 
Co. — Jury Blindfolding in Comparative Neg-
ligence Cases, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 569. 
Some Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons 
in Products Liability Cases, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 
3. 
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered the 
Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L. 
Rev. 495, 496. 
Mulherin v. Ingersoil: Utah Adopts Compar-
ative Principles in Strict Products Liability 
Cases, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 461. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — The 
Merger of Comparative Fault Principles with 
Strict Liability in Utah: Mulherin v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 964, 966. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 57 Am. Jur. 2d § 426 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 65A CJ.S. Negligence § 169 et 
seq. 
A.L.R. — Comparative negligence rule 
where misconduct of three or more persons is 
involved, 8 A.L.R.3d 722. 
Retrospective application of state statute 
substituting rule of comparative negligence for 
that of contributory negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d 
1438. 
Indemnity or contribution between joint tort-
feasors on basis of relative fault, 53 A.L.R.3d 
184. 
Modern development of comparative negli-
gence doctrine having applicability to negli-
gence actions generally, 78 A.L.R 3d 339 
Application of comparative negligence doc-
trine, generally, 86 A.L.R.3d 1206 
Comparative negligence doctnne applied to 
actions based on strict liability in tort, 9 
A.L.R.4th 633. 
Effect of adoption of comparative negligence 
rules on assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence, 16 A.L.R.4th 700. 
Key Numbers. — Negligence «=» 97 et seq. 
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and 
proportion of fault. 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, 
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of dam-
ages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each 
person seeking recovery and to each defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 3. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 3 repeals former § 78-27-39, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 3, relating to 
contribution among joint tortfeasors, and reen-
acts the above section. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Jury instructions. 
If requested, a trial court must inform the 
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning 
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it 
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the 
effect of such an instruction will not be to con-
fuse or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart, 658 
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault 
— No contribution. 
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be 
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the 
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that 
defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-40, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 4. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 4 repeals former § 78-27-40, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 4, relating to 
settlement by a joint tortfeasor, and reenacts 
the above section. 
Cross-References. — Enforcement of con-
tribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 69(h). 
Joint obligations, § 15-4-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Indemnity contract. 
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor. 
Workmen's compensation 
Indemnity contract. 
The former comparative negligence provi-
sions did not invalidate an employer's indem-
nity contract with a third party whereby em-
ployer agreed to indemnify the third party 
against claims arising out of injuries to the em-
ployer's employees Shell Oil Co v. Bnnker-
hoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187 (Utah 
1983). 
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor. 
Where plaintiff was awarded a judgment in 
action against a defendant to recover the prop-
erty loss sustained as the result of a collision 
between automobiles operated by defendant 
and the minor unemancipated daughter of the 
plaintiff, and where the daughter's negligence 
contributed to the property loss sustained by 
her father, the minor daughter was a joint tort-
feasor and liable to the defendant for contribu-
tion Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah 
1981). 
Workmen's compensation. 
Employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor as to 
an injury to his employee covered by the Work-
men's Compensation Act. Curtis v. Harmon 
Elec, Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976); Phillips 
v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah Al-
lows Contribution Against Cotortfeasor De-
spite Immunity from Direct Suit: Bishop v. 
Nielsen, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 429. 
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